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 Abstract 
The reforms of 1978 has engineered a shift from the “iron-rice bowl” approach of Mao’s era to 
increased privatization of social services. Citizens and non-profit organizations are taking on more 
financial and managerial responsibility for welfare services in the wake of the dissolution of state-owned 
enterprises. As China’s economy strengthens, more efforts are being directed to addressing the major 
issues of the coastal-inland income divide and the migrant worker population and aging population’s 
needs. The founding of the Non-Profit Incubator and the myriad services that NPI provides can be seen as 
part of an overall state effort to reach its objective of enhancing the welfare of its citizens with the help of 
non-state actors. 
 
 
 
 
Methodology 
The author surveyed existing literature on the Non-Profit Incubator, papers and journals on the 
non-profit sector in China, Chinese history, and China’s economic reforms and its effects. I also visited 
two of NPI’s sites in China to gather materials and have informal conversations with the staff and the 
patrons.  
 
 
Introduction 
The following sections trace the Chinese government’s treatment of welfare services from 1949 
to today. In the interest of brevity, many details, contradictions, and nuances have not been included, but 
the overall outline stands. 
When Mao Zedong took power in 1949, China’s economy had been devastated by over half a 
century of war and turmoil. Mao Zedong pushed for egalitarian distribution of resources and attempted to 
promote economic progress through collectivization and reorganization, but the numerous campaigns 
instituted from 1949 to his death in 1976 did little to better the situation. After Mao’s death, Deng rose to 
power and engineered a series of reforms that dismantled the welfare state. His successor, Jiang Zemin, 
largely continued with Deng’s policies and promoted growth of the private sector and foreign investment 
and trade. China’s economy has strengthened greatly under Deng’s and Jiang’s direction. When power 
transitioned to Hu Jintao in 2003, the state directed more energy and resources toward addressing the 
myriad social challenges that had been gaining increasing prominence.  
Reforms 
With the economic reforms of 1978, China began a major transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a market economy. Before the economic reforms of 1978, the dominating political ideology 
was Maoism, attributed to Mao Zedong, the first Chairman of the Communist Party of China (in office 
from 1949 to his death in September 1976). Maoism focused on expanding economic development and 
socialist reorganization to the countryside, with the goal of improving material conditions and achieving 
rural industrialization that would ultimately erase the distinction between town and countryside. The 
welfare system had three main principles: guaranteed employment, egalitarian distribution, and cradle-to-
grave coverage. The egalitarianism of this ideology was reflected in the state’s takeover of enterprises in 
1949, at the end of the Chinese Communist Revolution and the formation of the People’s Republic of 
China. Typically, state authorities assigned lifelong jobs to workers. The state-owned enterprises and 
agricultural communes and collectives provided for housing, education, child care, medical care, and 
retirement of its workers. However, several serious problems arose from the Central Planning system. 
First, public ownership of people’s communes and agricultural production incentivized workers to work 
less and freeload on the fruits of their comrades’ labor.  Second, when the consequences of lower 
agricultural production began to manifest, and a series of natural disasters hit, the state sector manipulated 
resources in favor of party members and state sector employees and purposely neglected those considered 
enemies of the state, their relatives, and the peasants with little power (Ngok, 2010). This resulted in the 
Great Leap Forward famine, which killed some 30 million people between 1959 and 1962 (Smil, 1999). 
The purges and violence of the Cultural Revolution further disrupted the economy, with widespread 
incidents of torture, murder, public humiliation, and suicide, often of those perceived as enemies of the 
state, generally the educated and the elite. The forced relocation of urban youth to the countryside 
exacerbated the stagnation in economic progress and deprived high school graduates from the opportunity 
to attend university (Brandt, 2008). 
After Mao’s death in 1976 and the end of the Cultural Revolution, large numbers of urban youth 
returned to their hometowns. The dismal economic prospects, combined with the flooding of the labor 
market and rapid population growth, resulted in widespread unemployment and social unrest. Deng rose 
to prominence amid the economic and social chaos and became the de facto leader in the second 
generation of leaders of the PRC. To tackle these problems, Deng emphasized economic construction and 
modernization via an economic model known as “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” He promoted 
growth of the private sector and foreign investment and trade and instituted sweeping reforms. In the first 
phase of reforms (late 1970s to 1980s), agricultural industry was decollectivized, limits on foreign 
investment was lifted, and private businesses were allowed to operate legally for the first time since the 
Communist takeover. Deng also created a series of special economic zones that became drivers of growth 
for the economy. In the second stage of reforms (late 1980s to mid-1990s), state control was decentralized 
in an effort to promote efficiency in the state sector, and Deng reopened the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
which had been closed since 1952. Deng continued to lessen controls on the private sector and allowed 
for privatization and contracting out of many struggling state-owned enterprises, though several powerful 
state monopolies remained (mainly banks and petroleum companies) (Lieberthal, 2004).  
When Jiang Zemin came into power in 1989 with the support of Deng, economic reforms 
accelerated. Jiang, Li Peng, and Zhu Rongji constituted the third generation of leaders. They introduced 
the ideology of the “Three Represents”: (1) economic production, (2) cultural development, and (3) 
political consensus (Communist Party of China [CPC], 2006). This was very much in line with Deng’s 
vision and the reforms instituted are often seen as a continuation of the reforms made in Deng’s period of 
influence. China’s entry in the World Trade Organization in 2001 was preceded by rounds of negotiations 
and agreements that opened up China further by reducing tariffs, trade barriers, and regulations, and that 
required Chinese state enterprises to operate in the same way as private enterprises. In 1997 and 1998, 
almost all state-owned enterprises, except for a few large monopolies, were liquidated and their assets 
sold to private investors (Lewis & Xue, 2004). 
The dissolution of the SOEs led to the creation of new institutions and programs to provide for 
welfare services that the SOEs had traditionally provided. To help workers cope with unemployment, the 
previous employers or state-funded employment centers offered a period of living allowances and a 
minimum living standard guarantee was instituted by the central government. A pension insurance system 
was also set up. It was funded by required contributions by individuals and employers and was comprised 
of a social pooling account and an individual account. In 1998, employers were no longer expected to 
provide for housing; assistance was instead to be provided by subsidies, housing provident funds with 
favorable terms, and low-rent public housing for the poor. In 1998, a nation-wide health insurance plan 
was introduced, to be financed by both employer and individual contributions, where 30% of 
contributions went to an individual account and 70% went to a social pooling account (Li, 2012). 
Effects 
By nearly all accounts, China’s reforms had their desired impact. Whereas average annual real 
GDP growth rate was estimated at 5.3% percent from 1960 to 1978, the rate had increased to 14.2% in the 
year before the 2008 global recession (as cited in Sedghi, 2012). From 1978 to 2008, the per capita 
income of rural residents had grown by 7.1%, while the disposable income of urban residents had risen by 
7.2% (as cited in ChinaDaily, 2008). 
This economic progress has not arrived without its challenges. In 2012, China officially reported 
its Gini coefficient at 0.474 (Schiavenza, 2013). A measure of 0.4 is generally considered to be potentially 
socially destabilizing (Wang & Yao, 2013). The difference is mainly between coastal and inland areas. 
Data from the China Statistical Yearbook shows that annual per capita income decreases gradually as 
distance from the coast increases (Schiavenza, 2013). Lack of opportunities inland drive citizens to 
migrate to the coastal areas to pursue a higher standard of living, but due to the household registration 
system (hukou), these migrants are effectively rendered as second-class citizens in the cities. They are 
denied access to urban housing and education for their children, have little bargaining power with their 
employers, and work in menial jobs for little pay (Kong, 2010).  
The migration to cities has also bred other problems associated with overpopulation – 
overcrowded and expensive housing, congested public transportation, environmental pollution, and higher 
crime rates. In addition, those left behind in the rural areas are often the elderly, the young, and the sick or 
disabled, increasing demand for care in areas with low population and little resources (Kong, 2010).  
China’s population demographics poses its challenges as well. The one-child policy, instituted in 
1979 to slow population growth and promote economic growth, has resulted in a small youth to senior 
citizen population. This, combined with rise in life expectancy and increase in cost of living, has created 
difficulties for single children responsible for financing both of their parents’ retirement by themselves, 
whereas they could have split the cost between siblings under different circumstances. Lack of retirement 
services, medical care, and nursing homes also contribute to the social burden of an ageing society 
(Lieberthal, 2004). 
Riots and protests over government land grabs have been one the rise, as are self-immolations, 
demonstrations, and clashes with the police in Tibet, over Chinese religious control and exile of their 
spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. (Taylor, 2012).  
 China has also seen a steady increase in cases of AIDS, a significant number due to blood 
transfusions (Taylor, 2012), marital and dating difficulties arising from the male-female ratio disparity 
largely attributed to sex-selective abortion as a result of the one-child policy, uncertainty about land use 
rights and possible forced relocation associated with local governments’ incentive to sell residential land 
rights to developers to raise revenues, corruption in the government, increased instances of fraud and 
scams, media censorship, protests against local government/businesses practices, and rise of an intensely 
materialist culture. As China’s economic situation has improved dramatically, its provisions for the social 
welfare of its citizens has lagged behind. These realities have bred discontent and social unrest, as 
evidenced in the increasing number of protests, demonstrations, riots, and petitions (Brandt, 2008). In 
2010, the number of these events exceeded 180,000, on average about 500 every day (Fisher, 2012).  
For these reasons, when political power passed to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in 2003, social 
stability became a central issue of their policies. In 2005, Hu and Wen emphasized the ultimate creation 
of a “Socialist Harmonious Society.” They introduced the “Scientific Outlook on Development,” an 
ideology featuring a technocratic approach to governance, sustainable development, and improvement of 
social welfare (Fewsmith, 2004). Social insurance was greatly enlarged in rural areas: in 2009, a series of 
rural social protection schemes were formally introduced, including pensions, support for single elderly 
without any help from families, and institution of minimum living standard provisions for rural 
households. The rural agricultural tax was also abolished to help narrow the rural-urban income gap (Li, 
2012). To address the needs of the migrant laborers, the state began to make public education available to 
children of migrant workers and offer a low level of legal and social support. Construction companies 
were also pressured to pay their workers on time (Li, 2012).  
 These challenges remain relevant today, and the new General Secretary, Xi Jinping, addressed 
them in his proclamation of the “Chinese Dream.” The Chinese Dream calls for the revitalization of the 
nation through daring Chinese citizens to dream and contribute to the nation’s sustainable development. 
According to some commentators, this means a China where all citizens enjoy a reasonably high standard 
of living in a “moderately well-off society” by about 2020 (Kuhn, 2013). 
Transition to a “Societalized Welfare” Model 
As we have seen, since the reforms, China has been moving from a “state welfare” model to a 
“societalized welfare” model (Guan, 2000). The government has been reducing its share of financial 
provision of welfare services and individuals and other organizations have been asked to share the 
expenses (e.g., pension, medical care, unemployment insurance). The government now mainly serves as 
regulation-maker, administrator, financial provider on a reduced level, and financial guarantor in some 
situations (Guan, 2000). The previous system of free public housing and low rents has also been replaced 
by marketization (Jiang 1999). In addition, this trend is evidenced in the rise of non-profits in China. 
Before the reforms, there were almost no non-governmental organizations providing social welfare 
services (Guan, 2000). As of 2012, there were over 460,000 officially registered nonprofit organizations 
(Tuan, 2012), and an estimated eight to ten million unregistered grassroots organizations (as cited in Guo, 
2012). However, the government still maintains a strong role in administering these services, as most of 
the registered nonprofits are actually government-organized nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs) 
(Guo, 2012).  
The Non-Profit Incubator (NPI) 
 Through my research, I found that although the Non-Profit incubator is not officially known as a 
GONGO, it enjoys political and financial support from the government and is directed by a considerable 
number of ex-government employees (NPI.org, 2010). Below is a brief overview of the Non-Profit 
Incubator and its various branches.  
The Non-Profit Incubator was founded in 2006 by Lv Zhao, a former deputy director of the 
Information Center for Non-Profit Organizations in Beijing. He had expressed interest in founding an 
organization to provide supporting services to non-profits and won permission from the Pudong Civil 
Bureau (Hui, 2010).  
NPI Enpai 
In 2007, NPI launched what was to become its flagship program, the nonprofit incubator. The 
incubator program is a year-long program that provides resources and training to a batch of carefully 
selected, budding non-profits. Resources include capacity building programs, micro-grants, free office 
space, shared facilities, and assistance with registration and fund raising. The incubator also aims to build 
a strong, mutually reinforcing network of nonprofits and individuals working in the nonprofit sector. To 
date, more than 40 nonprofits have graduated from incubation, and the incubator has the capacity to 
incubate 30 organizations per year, almost four times its starting capacity six years ago. Issues addressed 
by the organizations include assistance for drug addicts, caring for osteogenesis imperfect patients, AIDS 
advocacy, and youth development. The incubator has also been branched off of NPI as NPI Enpai 
(NPI.org, 2010). 
Community Service Platform 
The NPI community service platform was formed in 2008 to manage public facilities and oversee 
community service organizations. The platform started with the founding of the Enrichment Community 
Service Center (Wulixiang). By 2010, the center had won several entrusted projects including the 
management of the Citizen Center of Sanlin World Expo Garden in Pudong District, the Neighborhood 
Center of Yanji sub-district Office in Yangpu District, the Service Center for Disabled People of 
Shanggang sub-district in Pudong New Area, and the Yanji Community Social Service Center in Yangpu 
District. That same year, the platform expanded to Sichuan Province, where NPI launched programs to 
help rebuild areas affected by the earthquake in 2008 and a youth community service center complex in 
the technology zone of Chengdu. Wulixiang provides a wide range of services, ranging from assistance in 
finding affordable housing, services for the disabled, after-school programs, and recreational programs for 
the elderly (NPI.org, 2010).  
Venture Philanthropy 
NPI partnered with Lenovo Greater China in 2008 to run a Venture Philanthropy Program for 
promising start-up nonprofits and social enterprises. The program allocated approximately $2.5 million 
RMB to 16 winning grassroots organizations. In subsequent years, Lenovo China has expanded to 
program to include more than 30 winners and has incorporated themes for each year (NPI.org, 2010). 
CSR Consulting 
In 2007, NPI launched Corporate Citizenship in Action (CCiA), a consulting business to help 
companies implement their CSR activities more effectively. It now provides enterprises with various CSR 
consulting services such as CSR strategy planning and mechanism design, charitable project sales 
planning, management consultancy and evaluation, establishment of employee volunteering activities and 
management systems, corporate foundation strategy planning and project design, as well as the 
compilation of CSR reports. CCiA has also provided services to a number of large companies, including 
Motorola, Novartis, Lenovo, Vanke, Cannon, Nokia, Intel, HSBC, China Merchants Group, Baidu and 
Diageo (NPI.org, 2010). 
Additional Functions 
Apart from these activities, NPI also oversees an annual NPO Projects Exhibition (since 2009), 
runs a capacity building program on topics such as project management, finance management, laws & 
regulations, fund-raising, and information technology; and manages a “social innovation park” in 
Shanghai, which provides on-site job training and employment opportunities to disabled people, houses 
an art school/gallery, and restaurant management training, among other projects. Another branch of NPI, 
The Shanghai United Foundation, represents a variety of NGOs and social enterprises, and handles 
fundraising and streamlines allocation of resources. It is supported by Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau. 
(NPI.org, 2010) 
Conclusion 
With the reforms of 1978, the Chinese state abdicated its former role as the sole provider of 
welfare services. The transformational changes in China’s economy and society has brought about a wide 
array of social challenges that are being increasingly addressed by a combination of state and non-state 
actors. The Non-Profit Incubator is one example of an institution that works closely with the state and 
with citizens to improve the well-being of the populace in various ways and to support the development 
of organizations to join in the effort to meet these challenges. 
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